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Strained Parliamentary Relations  
Green-supported minority government in Tasmania 
Kate Crowley*  
This article takes Strom’s1 and Moon’s2 discussion of minority regimes and 
explores it in the Tasmanian context by reviewing the Labor–Green Accord 
(1989–92) and the Liberal–Green Alliance (1996–98) governments. It 
argues that these Green-supported minority governments in Tasmania, 
while short-lived and contentious, have had significant positive implications 
for public policy and the shaping of politics, and for not entirely precluding, 
in fact for encouraging, reform agendas. Indeed, it is argued that they 
illustrate Kingdon’s notion of policy windows whereby problems, policies 
and politics come together at critical times, in times of crisis for instance, 
and facilitate fundamental policy innovation and change. The article 
characterises Green minority government in Tasmania, examines the 
circumstances that led to its creation, acknowledges the ideological strain 
of Greens partnering government, but concludes that Green minority 
government offers significant reform opportunities. By considering these 
two very different governments, this paper adds empirical justification to 
Strom’s and Green–Pedersen’s3 case that minority governments are far 
from passive and constrained in terms of governing capacity. 
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Tasmania has experienced two Green-supported minority governments (Labor 
Green Accord 1989–1992) and (Liberal Green Alliance 1996–1998), the former 
based upon a formal agreement, the latter upon a less formal undertaking.4 These 
were not coalition arrangements because the Greens were excluded from exercising 
ministerial responsibilities. In the Labor Green Accord, the Greens were formally 
consulted prior to Cabinet decision-making. Any Cabinet decision at odds with 
Green policy was then played out politically in the public realm. The Liberal–Green 
Alliance was less formal, with the Tasmanian Greens basically undertaking to 
support budget legislation and not to vote down the Liberal minority government 
except upon issues of conscience, corruption or competence. In Moon’s terms, the 
Greens in the balance of power largely acted as a group (rather than as individuals) 
with substantive policy and political concerns (rather than particularistic motives), a 
pattern of parliamentary behaviour he describes as minoritarianism.5 
This article takes Moon’s discussion of minority regimes and explores it in the 
Tasmanian context. Tasmania’s Hare–Clark electoral system, the oldest single 
transferable vote system in the world, has been designed to be as democratic as 
possible with the people directly electing the members of the State’s House of 
Assembly (the lower house).6 Consequently, independent candidates have 
historically been elected and at times been relied upon to form State governments 
— in fact, Labor’s much celebrated 35 years of unbroken power in government 
relied for fourteen years upon the support of independents.7  
The Greens first tilt at the balance of power was at the 1972 State election prior to 
which they founded the world’s first Green party, the United Tasmania Group. They 
campaigned on a broad electoral platform that was eclipsed by their efforts to 
prevent the flooding of Lake Pedder. In effect, the bipartisan commitment to flood 
Lake Pedder by the major parties created the initial political space for the 
emergence of Green electoral politics which was further encouraged by the promise 
of the  
Hare–Clark system of proportional representation.8 
Contrary to the historical experiences of individuals acting as brokerage partners, 
when the Greens eventually partnered minority government they operated as a  
group with broad political and, indeed, transformational motives, although with  
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the right to vote on conscience. Generally speaking, in Moon’s terms, this is 
minoritarianism.9  
Because of the perceived partnering, not with self-interested independents, but with 
the ideological politics represented by the Greens, neither the Labor nor Liberal 
Green-supported minority governments enjoyed popular legitimacy nor indeed 
longevity. Significantly though, it was the major party partners in both cases rather 
than the Greens that suffered the worst post-regime electoral backlashes.10 These 
minority governments were, furthermore, subject to destabilisation from within 
parliament, from their relative political constituencies and from the Tasmanian 
media, impacting upon longevity in both cases. Nevertheless, these governments 
were positive vehicles for policy change, in particular for facilitating economic 
reform and for transcending the traditional conservatism of the major parties. 
Tasmanian conservatism has long promoted a bi-partisan policy consensualism, (on 
state development and resource development in particular), that has been 
acknowledged as a defining feature of Tasmanian politics11 and that is particularly 
challenged by Green-minority government. 
This article follows Haward and Larmour, Moon, Strom, and Green–Pedersen in 
arguing that minority governments have had significant positive implications for 
public policy and the shaping of politics, and for not entirely precluding, indeed for 
encouraging, reform agendas.12 Whilst governing in a politically conservative state 
like Tasmania with the Greens holding the balance of power will always be a 
precarious affair, it is argued here that it also enables rather than disables the act of 
government by opening up Kingdon’s window of policy opportunity. At certain 
critical times, the otherwise typically separate streams of problems, politics and 
policies can intersect so that problems encounter solutions which encounter 
favourable politics thus creating an opportunity for change.13 The Labor and the 
Liberal minority governments both achieved fundamental policy change — in 
                                                       
 9  More specifically, Moon explains that the Accord, by way of its formalistic nature, created an ersatz 
coalition; it is more difficult to define the nature of government arrangement after the collapse of the 
Accord but before the election other than as minoritarian. 
10 After the collapse of the Accord, Labor lost 2 seats and their vote fell from 34.7% to 28.9% whilst 
the Greens retained all their five seats, but did suffer a percentage loss from 17.1% to 13.2%.  After 
the collapse of the Liberal–Green alliance, the Liberals percentage loss was from 41.2% to 38%, 
whilst the Greens held steady on 11% (loss of seats is not relevant since the reform of parliament 
reduced seats from 35 to 25 in the House of Assembly) K. Crowley, ‘A Failed Greening?  The 
Electoral Routing of the Tasmanian Greens’, Environmental Politics, 8(4) 1999b, pp. 186–93.  
11 C. Sharman, ‘The Politics of Brokerage’, Current Affairs Bulletin, 53, 1977, p. 22. 
12 M. Haward and P. Lamour (eds), The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord and Public Policy 1989–
1992: Accommodating the New Politics? Federalism Research Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1993; Moon 
op cit; Strom op cit; Green–Pedersen op cit. 
13 J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1984. 
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economic, environmental and planning reform14 in the former, and in social justice 
and clean, Green planning reform15 in the latter. 
This article begins by characterising Green-minority government in Tasmania using 
Strom’s and Moon’s typologies and argues that the essential difference with such 
government is the ideological challenge posed by the Green balance of power 
holders. The article then explains the rise of the Greens and the circumstances that 
inevitably led them into power, and argues that the lack of political differentiation 
between the major parties has attracted voters to the Greens in Tasmania as a third 
way on environmental issues particularly. The strained relations in Green-supported 
minority government and the circumstances of minority government collapse are 
examined to show that Green partners in government are ideologically challenging 
and that in Tasmania this affects the longevity of the arrangement. Having 
characterised Green-minority government, examined the circumstances that led to 
its creation, and acknowledged the ideological strains of Green partners to 
government, the article then argues that minority government nevertheless offers an 
opportunity for reform. By examining the evidence from two very different 
governments, this article adds empirical justification to Strom and Green–
Pedersen’s case that minority governments are not, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, passive caretakers. 
Governing in Minority  
Strom explains that the experience of governing in minority is relatively common to 
parliamentary democracies, with minority cabinets accounting for about one-third 
of all the world’s post-war governments. Despite this, the minority government 
phenomenon is barely documented. Political science is either strangely silent on the 
subject, or critical in an ad hoc, impressionistic fashion that lacks sustained analysis. 
Conventional theory associates the formation of minority government with ‘social 
and political malaise’ at best, and views minority cabinets as ‘suboptimal and 
unstable solutions, which are resorted to only where all else fails’. Theory here 
applies only in the very loosest sense of the word, however, because there is little if 
any empirical justification provided of this negative, unsubstantiated evaluation of 
the minority experience. Not only is the theory of minority government formation 
less than adequate but, as Strom argues, there is even less research on the critical 
issue of the actual performance and capacity of minority government.16 
Stability and legislative effectiveness are two of the criteria used to assess the 
performance of government more generally, in a literature that again, even at the 
broader level, is entirely inadequate. Nevertheless, this literature does score 
                                                       
14 P. Hay, ‘Environment and Planning: A Record of Reform’, in M. Haward and P. Lamour (eds), The 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord and Public Policy 1989–1992: Accommodating the New Politics? 
Federalism Research Centre, ANU, Canberra, 1993, pp. 148–69.  
15 G. Buckman, ‘What Green Balance-of Power has done for Tasmania’, The Daily Planet: 
Tasmania’s Green Magazine, 56, September–October, 1998, p. 12. 
16 Strom op cit, p. 16. 
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minority governments poorly on both stability and effectiveness. Minority 
governments are considered to be less durable than single-party majority 
governments and to have a more passive, constrained, almost caretaker, 
performance. By undertaking his own cross-national surveys, Strom has remedied 
the lack of minority government research. His findings also counter much of the 
negative rhetoric, generalisations and assumptions about minority government. In 
his work, Strom also finds minority government formation to be the result of 
rational choice made by party leaders under certain structural constraints rather than 
the consequence of instability, conflict or malaise. He finds that, whilst it is true that 
minority regimes are less durable than majority coalitions, which has certainly been 
the recent Tasmanian experience, it is not necessarily the case that they perform 
particularly poorly in the policy sense.17 It is this aspect of Strom’s work that is of 
interest here. 
Moon’s more recent work has remedied the lack of research into what he reveals is 
the relatively common incidence of minority government arrangements in Australia. 
He finds that Australia has had a long, quite neglected, history of multi-partyism 
and minority government. ‘On average, just under one in three “state years” 
between 1910 and 1944 were administered by minority governments’, and that 
‘over one in six “state years” between 1945 and 1977 were administered by 
minority governments’. The fact that there were no minority governments between 
1977–1989 is exceptional rather than typical, as more recent times have shown.18 
Between 1989–95, ‘four of the six Australian states — Tasmania (1989–1992), 
South Australia (1989–1993) and New South Wales (1991–1995)’ witnessed 
minority government.19 Currently Australia has two minority governments20 in 
South Australia and in the Australian Capital Territory,21 and has recent experience 
of minority governments in Victoria and Queensland. None of these governments 
has been as challenged by their balance of power partners as minority governments 
in Tasmania. 
Moon’s typology of minority government is useful in characterising the Tasmanian 
experience. By minority government he means the absence of a parliamentary 
majority for the party with executive power. He distinguishes four types of minority 
regimes on the basis of two characteristics (i) whether the balance of power holders 
                                                       
17 Strom ibid, p. 238. 
18 Moon op cit, pp. 146–7. 
19 Moon, ibid. p. 142. The fourth state is the Australian Capital Territory where there has been 
continuous minority government. Moon claims that this analysis understates the Australian minority 
government experience because it excludes the implications of by-elections, parliamentary 
defections, post-electoral floor-crossing and unanticipated coalition formation (J. Moon, op cit).  
20 Mike Rann’s ALP minority government in South Australia elected in February 2002, and Jon 
Stanhope’s ALP minority government in the Australian Capital Territory elected in October 2001. 
Peter Beattie’s ALP government was recently reelected with a 41 seat majority after leading a 
minority government from June 1998 to February 2001, whilst Steve Brack’s ALP government was 
recently reelected in its own right after having governed in minority since October 1999.  
21 The Greens do hold the balance of power in the West Australian Upper House, and Kerrie Tucker, is 
potentially a Green balance of power holder in the Australian Capital Territory Legislative 
Assembly, as is Democrat, Roslyn Dundas. 
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operate as individuals or a collective; and (ii) whether they operate according to 
particularistic or general political motives (fig. 1). These two dimensions that 
characterise the balance of power holders in minority governments yield the four 
ideal types of minority government illustrated below: 
 
Figure 1: Moon’s Model of Balance of Power Holders and Minority Government 
 
      Motivation 
  Particularistic General Challenge 
Mode of Individual ersatz majoritarianism ad hoc majoritarianism 
Action Collective ersatz coalition minoritarianism 
 
Moon also finds that the incidences of minority government that have been 
achieved under a variety of electoral systems since the 1980s are attributable to the 
parliamentary and electoral failures of majoritarianism. Nevertheless, without 
electoral reform of the preferential electoral systems operating in the Australian 
States, (with the exception of Tasmania which has a proportional preferential 
system), he concludes that popular support for independents is unlikely to realign 
dominant electoral cleavages.22 Tasmania is the notable exception here, with the rise 
of the Greens as a third parliamentary force, and with the renewed Green electoral 
successes not only in Tasmania, but currently elsewhere in Australia. 
Tasmania has had the highest proportion of minority governments of the Australian 
States.23 It has been predisposed to minority regimes in the past because of its Hare–
Clark, multi-member electoral system of proportional representation and brokerage 
style of State politics,24 and it is now with the rise of the Greens.25 Before the 
                                                       
22 Ibid p. 160. 
23 Moon op cit. p. 146. 
24 This is an electoral system of proportional representation that has operated in Tasmania’s Lower 
House of Assembly since 1909 with five multi-member electorates that are filled using the single-
transferable vote. There are no by-elections, but rather a recount, unless no candidates remain of the 
same party as the outgoing member, in which case a by-election may be requested. Between 1909 
and 1956 the Assembly consisted of thirty members (six for each of five seats). This was enlarged in 
1959 to thirty five members to avoid hung parliaments (seven for each of five seats) Tasmanian 
Parliamentary Library, ‘Parliamentary Reform: Downsizing Parliament’, Parliamentary Fact Sheet 
Series, Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, 1998. Available online: 
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/reform. accessed March 1999.  In 1998 this was reduced to 25 
ostensibly to cut costs, but in effect in an attempt to disenfranchise independents and create stability 
Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, ‘Parliamentary Museum: Fact Sheet No. E3’ Parliamentary Fact 
Sheet Series, Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, 1999, http:/www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/e3.htm 
(accessed March 1999). 
25 K. Crowley, ‘The Greens are Back in Town: World Record Vote Achieved by Tasmanian Greens’, 
Ecopolitics: Thought and Action, 1(4), Spring, 2002, pp. 3–8; In 2002 the Tasmanian Greens 
received the highest Green vote at state level so far anywhere in the world — 18.1%. See A. Darby, 
‘Apple Isle Grows Ever More Green’, The Age, 22 July. 
[www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/07/21/10268998945339.html accessed 23 July 2002], and K. 
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Greens, Labor had dominated Tasmanian politics. The election of independents had 
been relatively commonplace, and some even held the balance of power.26 Indeed 
independents held the balance of power after the 1934 election, enabling Labor 
under Albert Ogilvie to begin its long reign in government; they kept Labor under 
Robert Cosgrove in power after the 1948 election; and supported Labor under Eric 
Reece in power after the 1959 election.27 Thus the notion that Labor dominated 
because it held office from 1934 to 1982 (except for 1969–72) is only partially true, 
its dominance in terms of votes, seats, its control of government,28 and its rhetorical 
success with hydro-industrialisation, notwithstanding. It prospered very often in a 
non-majoritarian position. 
Minority government before the advent of Green politics in Tasmania was coalition 
based, accommodationist and uncontroversial, in fact so unremarkable that, with the 
exception of the minority Bethune Liberal Government (1969–72), it is largely 
forgotten history. Moon calls such government ersatz majoritarianism. Give or take 
the political and/or policy concessions made to supporting independents, for all 
intents and purposes minority governments in Tasmania before 1989 were 
essentially majority governments. In such governments ‘the individual balance of 
power holders were (in general) persuaded not to oppose the government on policy 
or confidence issues and not to challenge government policy by means of their own 
legislative proposals’.29 
Tasmania’s Labor–Green Accord (1989–91) and the Liberal–Green Alliance (1996–
1998) were entirely different propositions. Minority government in Tasmania has 
presented in two clearly different fashions: (i) as ‘pre-Green’ consensual minority 
regimes and (ii) as ‘Green-supported’ conflictual minority regimes. Whilst the 
former regimes enjoyed the legitimacy, stability and effective consensus building 
that Moon associates with ersatz majoritarianism; the latter did not. Green-
supported minority regimes thus far have been conflictual affairs, which have not 
enjoyed popular legitimacy, have been short-lived, and have had no effective 
consensus-building processes between the governing minority regime and its Green 
partners. 
The shift in the character of Tasmanian minority government with the rise of the 
Greens is a clear temporal shift whereby traditional ersatz majoritarianism is giving 
way to a much more conflictual, short-lived yet dynamic minoritarianism that bears 
consideration. As Moon explains, the Tasmanian Greens now operate in a way that 
their post-war balance of power holding forebears would not have understood. Their 
                                                                                                                                            
Crowley, ‘The Rise and Rise of the Tasmanian Greens: The Tasmanian State Election 2002’, 
Environmental Politics, forthcoming. 
26 C. Sharman, G. Smith, and J. Moon, ‘The Party System and Change of Regime: The Structure of 
Partisan Choice in Tasmania and Western Australia’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 26, 
1991, pp. 409–28. Indeed there were majority governments returned in only 5 of the 10 elections 
that Labor contested over this time-frame, see p. 419. 
27 Townsley, op cit. 
28 Sharman et al. op cit. p. 416. 
29 Moon op cit. p. 145. 
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behaviour in minority government situations is collective, unified by policy and 
process goals which they see as antithetical to the conservative status quo that they 
believe is perpetrated by the major parties.30 The Tasmanian experience also 
confirms Moon’s point that the failure of majoritarianism can be blamed for the rise 
of minoritarianism, since the lack of policy differentiation, indeed the 
consensualism between the major parties has greatly encouraged the articulation of 
the Green political alternative. The high incidence of minority governments in 
Tasmania also confirms the anti-majoritarian logic of the Hare–Clark electoral 
system, that this high incidence was indeed the original intention of the electoral 
system.31 
Tasmania’s Political Greening 
Not only is Tasmania’s electoral system of proportional representation and its 
resultant high proportion of minority governments atypical, so too is the degree of 
policy consensualism, or lack of policy difference, in major party politics32. This 
has historically facilitated both parliamentary coalition building and a high degree 
of policy continuity between differing political regimes no matter what their 
politics, and has had its strongest manifestation in terms of the major parties 
consensualism on issues of development and exploitation of the environment. There 
is no better illustration of the political consequences of this than the 1972 founding 
of the world’s first Green party, the United Tasmania Group (UTG), by 
conservationists attempting to prevent the flooding of Lake Pedder, and finding an 
immovable political consensus in favour of hydro-inundation.33 Policy 
consensualism in Tasmania or, in Moon’s terms, the failed capacity of 
majoritarianism to respond to environmental concern about state development, thus 
goes a long way to explaining the rise and persistence of Green politics, and the 
Green-supported minority governments that resulted. 
Policy consensualism alone, however, would not have assured the parliamentary 
influence and achievements of the Greens. Any explanation for the parliamentary 
success of the Greens must be multi-factorial with policy consensualism merely a 
significant starting point. Firstly, there is an enduring concern with place in 
Tasmania that transcends party politics itself. Secondly, there is a lack of political 
differentiation between the major parties on state development and the environment. 
Thirdly, the Greens have a demonstrated capacity for revisioning conservative 
policy which is attractive to voters looking for clear alternatives. Fourthly, they 
pursue political and administrative accountability in general terms, including 
freedom of information, which resonates with a public whose distrust of politicians 
and politics is at an all time high. Finally, and most importantly, the Greens are 
offered political opportunity by Tasmania’s Hare–Clark electoral system of 
                                                       
30 Greens in Tasmania have been calling this status quo politics ‘Laborialism’ since the 1972 state 
election campaign. 
31 Moon ibid p. 148–51;  
32 Sharman et al. op cit.; Moon, op cit.  
33 Crowley 1999, op cit. 
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proportional representation, which was a major motivating factor behind the 
founding of the UTG.34 The combination of these factors has seen an electoral 
realignment that led the Greens into balance of power situations.  
Beginning at the beginning then, with the Lake Pedder dispute, the UTG achieved a 
Tasmania-wide vote of 3.9% in 1972 but, not at the expense of Labor, which 
regained majority government with a record high of 54.9%.35 The high vote for 
Labor at the same time as the first electoral showing of Green politics anywhere in 
the world shows that it was not a political movement founding itself at Labor’s 
expense. The previous government had been the 1969–72 minority Bethune Liberal 
Government. This Government was voted into office in the midst of the looming 
Lake Pedder controversy. Having questioned the Pedder scheme in opposition, 
Bethune warmed to it once Premier, whilst Opposition Leader Eric Reece, who had 
championed the idea when he was Premier, was very eager to flood. Indeed, this is 
partly why he lost office in 1969,36 ending thirty-five unbroken years of Labor in 
government, as Australia’s first premier to fall from power on environmental 
grounds. The Bethune Government went on to prove Strom’s minority government 
productivity thesis in terms of the environment at least by founding Tasmania’s 
national parks system and environmental protection measures.37 His minority 
arrangement also ran its full term without the ideological challenge of Green 
partners. 
Prior to the 1972 State election, the consensus between the major parties on 
development saw them declare Lake Pedder a ‘non-issue’, prompting 
conservationists to form the UTG and attempt to snatch the balance of power which 
was precariously held by an independent, Kevin Lyons.38 In other words, as 
Johnson explains, the UTG made a deliberate attempt to manoeuvre itself into a 
position of influence with government. Ironically, it found its major political 
opponent was the unaccountable monolithic state development instrumentality, the 
Hydro-Electric Commission (HEC) whose plans for flooding the southwest 
wilderness were routinely approved without amendment by parliament.39 It was at 
least another decade or more before the power of the HEC was tamed, ironically by 
                                                       
34 Crowley 2002, op cit. 
35 Tasmanian Parliamentary Library, House of Assembly Election Results 22 April 1972 
http://www.parliament.tas.gov.au/tpl/Elections/e1972.htm (accessed February 2003). 
36 The disastrous 1967 bushfires and the continuing effects of the drought played their part in Reece’s 
loss. I owe to Richard Herr the observation that the Casino referendum and parochial north/south 
politics were additional significant factors. 
37 Townsley observes that the Bethune Liberal Government’s legislation was reformist in the broadest 
sense, embracing activities as varied as police training, control of business in the interest of 
consumers, control of government employees in the interest of citizens, environmental controls, and 
the liberalisation of licensing laws in the interests of tourism (W.A. Townsley, Tasmania: 
Microcosm of the Federation or Vassal State, St David’s Park Publishing, Hobart, 1994, p. 288). 
38 D. Johnson, Lake Pedder: Why a National Park Must Be Saved, Griffin Press, Adelaide, 1972. 
39 R. Herr and B. Davis, ‘The Tasmanian Parliament, Accountability, and the Hydro-Electric 
Commission’, in J.R. Nethercote (ed.), Parliament and Bureaucracy — Parliamentary Scrutiny of 
Administration: Prospects and Problems in the 1980s, Hale & Iremonger/Australian Institute of 
Public Administration, Sydney, 1982, pp. 268–79. 
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the Liberal Premier Robin Gray who fashioned his brash leadership style and 
contempt for Green meddling in state development and politics on Labor’s Eric 
Reece. All the elements of place, lack of policy differentiation, policy revisioning, 
pursuit of political accountability, and electoral opportunity thus characterise the 
Lake Pedder issue. 
It is important to note at this point, in terms of the rise, persistence and success of 
Green politics, that Tasmania’s Green politics was clearly inspired, but not totally 
invented, as Hay and Haward40 argue, for the purposes of nature conservation. 
Indeed, the UTG originally embedded their politics in a broad revisioning of 
development, technology, work, society and institutional design41 (UTG, 1990) that 
underpins the Greens clean, Green, clever agenda today. The UTG failed to save 
Lake Pedder which was flooded by the Reece Labor Government on its landslide 
return to power in 1972, not withstanding the fact that it needed to undermine the 
newly proclaimed national parks legislation to do so. Labor was, however, 
untroubled by Green politics and held power by a comfortable majority until a more 
strategically sophisticated wilderness politics reared its head over the Franklin Dam 
dispute. This conservationist charge was led by the newly formed and tactically 
skilled Tasmanian Wilderness Society. Labor subsequently imploded over its 
inability to manage the Franklin issue and to resolve its own tensions between 
conservatism and reformism.42 From this time forth, a significant realignment of the 
Tasmanian electorate was inevitable. 
Over the 1980s, Green support did grow at Labor’s expense to 17.1% and five seats 
in 1989 that finally gave the Greens the balance of power. This realignment saw 
Labor, with 45 years in power between 1934 and 1982 broken only by the Bethune 
interregnum between 1969 and 1972, face two successive electoral defeats in 1982 
and 1986. The electorate increased in volatility from the 1982 Franklin dispute.  
Dr Bob Brown entered parliament on a recount in 1982.43 Dr Gerry Bates, who had 
been campaigning against a silicon smelter in a rural residential area, joined Dr 
Brown at the 1986 state election. His election doubled the Green vote. The 
traditional two party dominance of the Lower House then gave way completely at 
the next state election in 198944 when the election of five Green Independents who 
had campaigned against the failed billion dollar Wesley Vale pulp mill brought the 
                                                       
40 P. R. Hay and M. Haward, ‘Comparative Green Politics: Beyond the European Context?’ Political 
Studies XXXVI, 1988 pp. 433–48. 
41 UTG, ‘The New Ethic’, in C. Pybus and R. Flanagan, The Rest of the World is Watching: Tasmania 
and the Greens, Pan MacMillan Publishers, Sydney, 1990 pp. 34–36. 
42 D. Lowe, The Price of Power: The Politics Behind the Tasmanian Dams Case, MacMillan, South 
Melbourne, 1984. 
43 Dr Bob Brown took Sanders’s place in 1982 on a recount. Sanders, an Australian Democrat, was the 
first Green elected to the Lower House in the electorate of Denison. He stood down in 1982 in 
disgust over the Franklin dispute and successfully contested a Senate seat. Dr Brown took Sanders’s 
seat directly from Risdon Prison where he was being held on Franklin related protest charges. He 
founded the Tasmanian Greens in 1989 after campaigning with other Green candidates as a Green 
Independent. 
44 M. Haward and G. Smith, ‘The Tasmanian Election: The Green Independents Consolidate’, 
Australian Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 1990 pp. 34–48. 
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Greens to 17.1%.45 At the 2002 election, they gained 18.1% and four seats, the 
highest Green vote ever in the world even though the Tasmanian Electoral Act had 
been amended to reduce the size of the Lower House and return it to stability by 
wiping them out.46 
Labor lost parliamentary ground to the Greens during the 1980s, even though Green 
politics had not been founded at Labor’s expense, and reclaimed office in 1998 only 
after amending the Tasmanian Electoral Act. The Liberal Party was relatively 
unscathed by the Greens despite Premier Gray’s brash behaviour during the Wesley 
Vale dispute. He only lost majority government in 1989 by the slenderest of 
margins. Labor support was down to 34.7% in 1989, twenty percentage points 
below Eric Reece’s 54.9% record high in 1972, when it accepted minority 
government with the five Greens as the balance of power holders. What we see in 
the formation of this minority arrangement, other than that it was born directly of 
the Wesley Vale pulp mill crisis, is that it was the product, in Strom’s terms, of 
malaise, but malaise that was long-standing, stretching right back to 1972. There 
was a public backlash against Labor after the failure of its minority government 
with its harsh economic reformism. A Liberal majority government followed, 
picking up the reformist reins, and suffering its own defeat and loss of majority in 
1996. With Labor refusing any further deals with the Greens, and the electorate in 
no mood for another election, the Liberals made an informal arrangement to govern 
in minority with Green support.47 
Strained Relations with the Greens  
Having achieved the partnering of two very different minority governments, the 
influence of the Greens by virtue of these arrangements was significant but 
inevitably short-lived. Both arrangements were doomed, because of both the 
principled policy stance of the Greens that is atypical for its resistance to bargaining 
and compromise in the traditional sense, and the lack of legislative influence and 
pathways of the minority governments. Longevity does not need to be a problem for 
minority governments, as governments in the Australian Capital Territory can attest, 
having been in continuous minority government and often having to turn to 
independents, including Greens, for support.  
The longevity problem in Tasmania has various sources beyond the nature of the 
partners to government, however. Firstly, unlike the ACT, Tasmania has a 
bicameral parliament with a conservative Upper House that is hostile to minority 
government. Secondly, Labor entered minority government with the Greens, and 
frustrated the subsequent Liberal–Green-minority government, quite expediently in 
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the interests of reclaiming power. Thirdly, minority government has limited 
legislative pathways. And, finally, as Herr argues, the lessons have not yet been 
learned, with regard to the accommodation in an institutional and operational sense, 
of the Greens as a third parliamentary party in Tasmania.48 
The Liberal–Green alliance, as noted above, was significantly different from the 
Accord for not resting upon a formal arrangement, and thus for returning the 
debating of issues to the floor of the parliament where the Greens have long 
maintained they belong.49 It was also different for its attempt at consultative, rather 
than adversarial, politics, beginning with a multi-party forum to explore more 
innovative, consensus-based mechanisms for government which was initially 
shunned by Labor.50 Consultative politics was a gamble for the Liberals and the 
Greens, not least because of Labor’s dismissal of any attempt to create discursive 
space between traditional political adversaries as an opportunistic cliché.51 
Nevertheless, the alliance was greatly facilitated by the trust built up for some time 
at least between two consensual leaders, Liberal Premier Tony Rundle and Greens 
leader Christine Milne. By contrast, the Labor minority government was notable for 
the extremely adversarial political styles of both Labor Premier Michael Field and 
Greens leader Bob Brown. 
The longevity of the Labor–Green Accord suffered greatly from there never having 
been harmonious Labor–Green relations, from Labor assuming office having just hit 
an unprecedented electoral low, and from its determination to rebuild. Labor 
granted the Greens significant concessions in the document that formalised the 
Accord, as if that were its final dealings with them, Hay52 argues, before settling 
down to govern alone. The longevity of the Liberal–Green alliance, on the other 
hand, which was more consensual, was still undermined by the different political 
styles, adversarial and consultative, of the respective parties, by their different 
visions, short term and long term, and their different philosophies. It was hard for 
the Liberals to disengage, as the Greens demanded, from adversarial politics as a 
zero-sum game of tactical advantage when Labor was approaching every issue as an 
opportunity to manoeuvre to rebuild its support. There were tough choices for the 
Greens, as well, between the environmental deal-making possibilities of being a 
minority government supporter so well exploited by the Accord, and the harder task 
of attempting to change a political mindset towards cooperative politics. The 
external negative pressures that adversely affected the alliance included pressure 
from negative media, from the business community, and, crucially, sustained 
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pressure from Labor to reduce parliamentary numbers, in effect to wipe out the 
Greens. 
There certainly had been a strong public expectation that parliamentary numbers 
would be reduced following the previous Liberal majority Government’s awarding 
of a pay-rise of 40% to State parliamentarians which was to be in exchange for a 
reduction in the size of parliament. The Liberal–Green alliance inherited the legacy 
of a public angry that the pay-rise had been delivered in a climate of economic 
rationalisation, including massive public sector job losses, without any reduction, as 
promised, of parliamentary numbers. Reform was inevitable, then, and the Liberal 
Premier did initially advocate a reduction from 54 to 44 total members that would 
have kept the Hare–Clark electoral quota of 12.5% unchanged in the Lower House 
and was thus no threat to the Greens. Ultimately, however, it was Labor’s model of 
40 members that was adopted. This left 15 in the Legislative Council and 40 in the 
Lower House, the latter achieved by reducing the five by seven-member electorates 
to five by five-member electorates and by raising the electoral quota to 16.7%.53 
Under this reformed system, whilst the Green vote held steady at about 10.2% at the 
1998 election, three of four Green seats were lost, in effect disenfranchised.54 
The successful reform of State parliament achieved by an ultimately united Liberal–
Labor push shows just how the consensualism of the major parties on key policy 
issues — economic reform and state development, for example — is not threatened 
by minority government where the major parties unite to outvote the Greens. In fact, 
Moon55 has described the Greens in minority government as a parliamentary pole, 
rarely holding the balance of power, but more commonly opposing the major 
parties. The minority Liberal Government ended up voting on parliamentary reform 
with Labor because its budget and thus own reform agenda had been stalled by the 
combined opposition of Labor and the Greens to the privatisation of the state-owned 
Hydro-Electric Commission.56 McCall57 captures the minority Liberal 
Government’s tortured efforts partially to sell Tasmania’s ‘infrastructure icon’, the 
Hydro-Electric Commission, pursue its New Directions Strategy, restructure local 
government, and downsize State parliament. If these efforts were not enough to 
strain its relations with its Green partners, then its continuing efforts to attract grand 
resource-based development projects and to conclude Tasmania’s contentious 
Regional Forestry Agreement certainly were. 
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Minority Government Performance and Capacity  
In keeping with Strom’s analysis of minority government, it is clear that neither the 
Labor–Green Accord nor the Liberal–Green Alliance were durable arrangements, 
but were they innovative, reformist experiences with credible, albeit contested, 
legislative performances? Having characterised Green-minority government, 
examined the circumstances that led to its creation, and acknowledged the 
ideological strains of Green partners to government, I will now argue that Green-
minority government nevertheless offers an opportunity for reform. It is fairly easy 
to dismiss the contrary argument, as Strom does, that minority governments are 
passive caretakers waiting for an opportunity to go to an election. But it is also clear 
that ideological polarity between the partners to government will frustrate the core 
agendas of both and that this is a particular problem in Westminster systems with 
their limited partnering opportunities for legislating innovative reform. There has 
been no empirical measurement of the performance and capacity of Tasmania’s 
minority governments, so that most accounts remain partial and personal. In the 
cross-national context, Strom also finds no systematic studies of minority 
government performance, but he does note that government performance generally 
is typically measured by two criteria, stability and legislative capacity. 
As we have seen, Green-supported minority government in Tasmania certainly does 
not measure up well in terms of stability, but what about in terms of legislative 
effectiveness? Again, there have been no empirical studies so it may be useful to 
consider the fate of what I will call signature reforms. These would be major 
reforms clearly associated with the formation of minority arrangements. For 
instance, the recent minority Victorian Labor Government was supported by three 
independents via a loose charter that establishes the parameters for their relationship 
with the government. In terms of signature reforms, this charter undertakes to 
address the democratic deficits left in the wake of Liberal Premier Kennett with 
respect to the office of the Auditor-General, freedom of information, upper house 
reform and fixed-term parliaments.58 Perhaps the most significant reform achieved 
by the Government has been at the behest of independent Craig Ingramm, who 
pioneered an intergovernmental deal between NSW, Victoria and South Australia to 
return the flow of the Snowy River from 1% to 21% and ultimately 28%.59 
Similarly the minority South Australian Labor Government is supported by two 
Liberal defectors, via a compact modeled on the Victorian charter, in return for a 
significant, deliberatively driven, parliamentary reform.60 
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Green–Pedersen offers economic capacity as the signature reform by national 
minority governments in Denmark, and shows how a minority situation may enable 
rather than disable the legislative effectiveness of government. From being on the 
brink of an economic abyss in the early 1980s, Denmark is now celebrating the 
economic miracle that has been achieved over the last twenty years by continuous 
minority governments of both the left and the right.61 The secret to this success, 
Green–Pedersen argues, is the break down in the political polarity of the parliament 
between the major parties that has facilitated multi-party politics and the making of 
ad hoc agreements with changing coalitions. He concludes that ‘the effectiveness of 
minority governments depends on their flexibility, which again — apart from 
depending on parliamentary norms — depends very much on developments within 
the party system’.62 As mentioned, Tasmania has an electoral system of proportional 
representation that has left it with the highest incidence of minority governments in 
Australia, but that has encouraged non-aligned issue-based independents with 
identifiable personalities and localised interests. Before the rise of the Greens, 
multi-party politics failed to emerge, Townsley argues, because of the lack of 
political space between the State’s two moderate, conservative political parties.63  
Pre-Green, consensual minority regimes in Tasmania, Moon’s ersatz majoritarian 
regimes, enjoyed high legitimacy, stability, effective consensus-building and 
legislative capacity. It is the more recent Green-supported conflictual minoritarian 
regimes that have not enjoyed such legitimacy, stability, consensus-building or 
legislative capacity. Nevertheless, their reform performance has been impressive. 
The signature reforms of the Labor–Green Accord minority government were set 
out in a formal written agreement that included a commitment to stable government 
and a reiteration of Labor’s reform agenda.64 In terms of environmental reforms, the 
Accord delivered policy initiatives here including the declaration of the Douglas-
Apsley National Park, significant extensions to south-west World Heritage area, the 
halting of a major proposed pulp mill, planning and process reforms.  
By contrast, the minority Liberal Government offered no formal accord agreement, 
so its environmental reforms were less apparent, and were limited to continuing 
refinement of administrative developments set in train by the Accord, and the 
development of State policies. The Greens also claim the declaration of new 
national parks and forest reservations, the deferral of logging in some contested 
areas, and the clean green policy direction adopted by the minority Liberal 
Government’s Directions agenda as significant achievements.65 
Both Green-supported minority governments also achieved what I will call 
consensual process reforms, in the Accord’s case again mainly up-front by written 
agreement, and in the Alliance’s case by both agreeing governing parameters up-
front and by continuing negotiation. In the Accord’s case, there was written 
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agreement on fixed four year parliamentary terms, freedom of information, equal 
opportunity, access to Government by the Greens, their role in parliament, 
processes for resolving forestry disputation, local government reform and so forth.66 
The minority Liberal Government agreed to the Greens request for an all-party 
forum that set process parameters including the televising of State parliament, the 
review of standing orders to achieve decorum in debate, conflict resolution 
measures, procedures for bringing on Green bills, and so forth.67 The Greens also 
cite the Alliance’s achievements as including gun law reform, gay law reform, an 
apology to the Tasmanian Aboriginal community’s stolen children by the 
Tasmanian Parliament, and the disaggregation of the Hydro-Electric Commission 
(HEC). In terms of achieving core agendas, however, both the Accord and the 
Alliance were frustrating experiences for all the parties involved as the premature 
collapse of both arrangements clearly attests. 
There is a final reform style witnessed by these arrangements, and critical to its 
collapse, that I will call crash through or crash reforms, after Haward and Zwart68 
who use this terminology in the local government context. These are the reforms 
that break minority governments. The Accord thus collapsed over the minority 
Labor Government’s proposed resource security for the forest industry, and the 
alliance over the minority Liberal Government’s proposed sale of hydro-assets in 
order to retire debt and finance the budget. These reforms were always going to 
crash rather than crash through with the Greens already struggling, as minority 
partners with no legislative capacity of their own, to make the kind of 
environmental difference that their supporters expected.69 Interestingly, Labor 
gambled rightly that it could gain Liberal support for its forest measures before 
losing government, but the Liberals gambled wrongly that the favour would be 
returned over the sale of the HEC. The most successful example of this sort of crash 
through reform was economic reform by the minority Labor Government closely 
identified at the time with the Greens. In the long run this economic reform has 
proved Tasmania’s salvation but at the time was enormously resented, with the 
Greens most critical of cuts to education and the closure of regional schools.70 
Conclusions 
Do minority governments offer windows of policy opportunity then, and are they 
worth the stressful effort and strained relations of partnering with ideological 
opponents such as the Greens? I have argued that these governments have been 
positive vehicles for policy change in Tasmania for facilitating reform and for 
transcending the conservative policy mindsets and practices of the major parties. 
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They have delivered on the environment in particular in terms of enhanced 
protection notwithstanding the unresolved debate over the clear felling of 
Tasmania’s remnant old growth forests. The fact that minority arrangements have 
not been able to deliver change on this is instructive of the capacity of minority 
government when the major parties chose to vote together against the Greens. 
Minority situations are critical times. They make government vulnerable. But there 
is an invaluable intersection of ‘problems with solutions with favourable politics’ 
that Kingdon sees as a policy window. We have seen that these arrangements have 
been short-lived, foundering on principle, as such arrangements are wont to do with 
Green partners, when the minority government challenges its partners on core 
issues. The strain of such government shows in its instability, but its benefits are 
shown in its productivity. The experience of Green-supported minority government 
in Tasmania has indeed added justification to Strom’s and Green–Pedersen’s case 
that challenges the conventional wisdom about minority governments as weak in 
terms of governing capacity.  ▲ 
 
